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LIST OF PARTIES 
The only party on appeal who was a party to the 
proceeding in the Court whose order is sought to be reviewed is 
Janet Higham, plaint iff/appellant. Progressive Insurance Company, 
the automobile insurer of the plaint iff/appellant, is respondent 
in this proceeding because the Third District Court's order 
released to the insurer funds to which both Janet Higham and 
Progressive Insurance Company claim a right. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court vests by virtue of 
Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. The proceedings below involved the 
settlement of appellant's claims against two of the defendants and 
the entry of default judgment against a third in the underlying 
suit. The settlements were of claims based on the Utah Dramshop 
Act and the judgment was based on the negligence of an uninsured 
motorist. Appellant's automobile insurer asserted rights to a 
portion of the settlement funds. The portion, representing the 
amounts the insurer paid appellant for personal injury protection, 
uninsured motorist coverage, and collision coverage, was deposited 
with the Court in which the underlying suit lay. The insurer 
filed a Motion to Intervene and a Motion for Release of Funds. 
The Court, after receiving memoranda and hearing argument 
regarding the right of the insurer to intervene and the rights of 
the appellant or her insurer to the amount deposited with it, 
denied the insurer's motion to intervene but granted its motion 
for release of funds. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are: 
1. Whether an automobile insurer which pays uninsured 
motorist, personal injury protection, and collision coverage 
benefits for injuries and damages its insured incurs as a result 
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of a collision with an uninsured motorist has rights of 
subrogation or reimbursement to funds its insured receives from 
litigating claims against the uninsured motorist or whether no 
such rights exist under the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act; 
2. Whether, under the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act or 
the provisions of the specific contract of insurance between 
appellant and respondent, an insurer has rights of subrogation or 
reimbursement to funds its insured receives from settlement of 
claims litigated against tort-feasors other than uninsured 
motorists; and 
3, Whether equitable principles militate against 
subrogation if an insured's recovery from tort-feasors has not 
made her whole. 
STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY DEEMED 
TO BE DETERMINATIVE 
Statutes believed to be determinative of the respective 
issues raised are Section 31A-22-302, Section 31A-22-305(3), 
Section 31A-22-307, and Section 31A-22-309, Utah Code Ann. The 
statutes are set forth verbatim in the addendum hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case, in its status before this Court, is an appeal 
from the order of the Third Judicial District Court granting 
release to respondent of $35,082.00 of the funds appellant secured 
through a settlement of dramshop claims against private clubs. 
The clubs served alcohol to an uninsured motorist, whose truck 
subsequently collided with appellant's vehicle and caused her 
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severe physical injury. The case presents questions of law under 
the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act and questions involving equitable 
principles. The respondent was not a party to the action below, 
but filed a motion to intervene and a motion for release of the 
portion of appellant's settlement funds which was equal to 
payments the insurer made to appellant under her automobile 
insurance policy. The court granted the insurer's motion for 
release of funds but, at the same time, denied its motion to 
intervene. The insurer had filed its motions after the 
appellant's settlement with the dramshop defendants and after 
entry of judgment against the uninsured motorist defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The appellant, Janet Higham, was severely injured 
(R. 74-80) in an automobile accident involving an inebriated, 
uninsured motorist, Jerome Patrick Scholtz (referred to hereafter 
as "Scholtz"), in Park City, Utah, on March 3, 1983. (R. 54, 151, 
784, 836.) 
2. Appellant's automobile insurer, Progressive 
Insurance Company (referred to hereafter as "Progressive"), paid 
appellant $11,163.00 in personal injury protection benefits, 
$20,000.00 for uninsured motorist coverage, and $3,919.00 of 
collision coverage under her policy. (R. 872,783.) Progressive 
sought appellant's signature on a release and trust agreement 
covering the $20,000.00 sum, but appellant did not agree to or 
sign the agreement. (R. 862, 873.) 
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3. Prior to the accident in which appellant was 
injured, Scholtz had been drinking alcoholic beverages at two Park 
City private clubs, the Black Pearl and The Club. (R. 1-8.) 
4. In December, 1983, the appellant filed suit against 
Scholtz, The Black Pearl, and The Club. (R. 1-8.) 
5. Progressive was aware of appellant's suit and her 
allegations against all of the defendants from its inception. (R. 
872, 873.) 
6. At various times during discovery and settlement 
negotiations, appellant's attorneys communicated to Progressive 
the fact that appellant did not believe her insurer had any rights 
under its policy or in law to be subrogated to any recovery she 
might achieve. (R. 886-889, 917, 919.) 
7. Without moving to intervene, Progressive filed a 
Notice of Subrogation Interest in the amount of $35,082.00 on May 
29, 1985. (R. 957, 958.) 
8. Appellant reached an agreement to settle her claims 
against The Club on March 18, 1986, (R. 453) and, in January of 
1987, agreed to a settlement of her claims against The Black 
Pearl. (R. 692.) 
9. On January 26, 1987, counsel for appellant and 
counsel for Progressive stipulated to the deposit of the amount to 
which Progressive claimed a right, $35,082.00, with the Court for 
the purpose of achieving final resolution of the appellant's suit 
against the clubs and to allow the Court to rule on Progressive's 
claim. (R. 711, 712.) 
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10. After approval of her settlements with The Club and 
The Black Pearl, the appellant received a trial setting for suit 
against Scholtz. It was set for March 17, 1987. Scholtz failed 
to appear. The appellant presented evidence of her damages and 
received a verdict and $139,716.76 judgment against Scholtz. (R. 
715. ) 
11. Counsel for Progressive was present in Court at the 
trial of appellant's claims against Scholtz and attempted to 
object to appellant's evidence of damages. The trial court 
refused to consider his objections, ruling that Progressive had no 
standing in the matter. (R. 715.) 
12. On July 8, 1987, appellant moved for judgment that 
she was entitled to the deposited funds. (R. 783-784.) 
13. Progressive moved to intervene in appellant's suit 
and filed a Motion for Release of Funds, claiming entitlement to 
the $35,082.00, on July 23, 1987. (R. 866-870.) 
14. Appellant filed memoranda in opposition to 
Progressive's motions on July 29, 1987. (R. 897-962.) 
15. The Court held a hearing on the claims to the 
funds and Progressive's motion to intervene on August 3, 1987, 
and on November 5, 1987, ruled that appellant's motion for summary 
judgment be denied, Progressive's motion for leave to intervene be 
denied, and Progressive's motion for release of funds be granted. 
(R. 972.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The following is a succinct condensation of the 
arguments actually made in the body of this brief: 
Argument, Point I; The Court below erred in releasing 
the deposited funds to Progressive because a no-fault insurer has 
no right of subrogation or right to reimbursement against its own 
insured under the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act. Progressive's 
rights, if any, to recoup uninsured motorist benefits paid to 
appellant are against the uninsured motorist tort-feasor, not the 
insured. The insurer has no subrogation right or right of 
reimbursement for personal injury protection benefits or collision 
coverage because the coverage is secured by premium paid by the 
insured and the insurer would receive double recovery through the 
exercise of such a right. 
Argument, Point II: The Court below erred in releasing 
the funds in question to Progressive because neither the law nor 
the provisions of the specific contract between insured and 
insurer give the insurer the right to subrogation or to 
reimbursement of monies an insured motorist receives from tort-
feasors other than an uninsured motorist tort-feasor. 
Argument, Point III: The Court below erred in releasing 
the funds in question to Progressive because it is not equitable 
to allow an insurer to recover monies paid under its contract from 
an insured whose recovery through litigation has not made her 
whole. 
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POINT I 
UNDER UTAH LAW, AN AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY 
INSURANCE CARRIER DOES NOT HAVE RIGHTS OF 
SUBROGATION OR REIMBURSEMENT FOR UNINSURED 
MOTORIST COVERAGE, PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION, 
OR COLLISION COVERAGE BENEFITS PAID TO ITS OWN 
INSURED FOR DAMAGES INCURRED BY THE INSURED IN 
ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY UNINSURED MOTORISTS. 
The components required in motor vehicle insurance 
policies in Utah are now set forth in the motor vehicle insurance 
chapter of the Insurance Code, Section 31A-22-302, Utah Code Ann., 
which provides: 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination 
of policies purchased to satisfy the owner's 
or operator's security requirement of Section 
41-12a-301 shall include: 
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage 
under Sections 31A-22-303 and 31A-22-302; 
and 
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under 
Section 31A-22-305, unless affirmatively 
waived under Subsection 31A-22-305(4). 
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination 
of policies, purchased to satisfy the owner's 
or operator's security requirement of Section 
41-12a-3Gl, except for motorcycles, trailers, 
and semitrailers, shall also include personal 
injury protection under Sections 31A-22-306 
through 31A-22-309. 
(3) First party medical coverages may be 
offered or included in policies issued to 
motorcycle, trailer, and semitrailer owners or 
operators. These owners and operators are not 
covered by personal injury protection 
coverages in connection with injuries incurred 
while operating any of these vehicles. 
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A. Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
The uninsured motorist coverage required by Section 31A-
22-302(l)(b) is described in Section 31A-22-305(3): 
(3) Uninsured motorist coverage under 
Subsection 31A-22-3Q2(1)(b) provides coverage 
for covered persons who are legally entitled 
to recover damages from owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily 
injury, sickness, disease, or death, in limits 
which at least equal the minimum bodily injury 
limits for motor vehicle liability policies 
under Section 31A-22-304. 
The essence of Sections 31A-22-302(1)(b) and 31A-22-305(3) was 
codified in Section 41-12-21.1 prior to the legislature's 1986 
amendment (and renumbering) of the Insurance Code. In Lima v. 
Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982), this Court stated, 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, Section 41-12-21.1 
requires that automobile liability insurance 
policies include coverage for accidents with 
uninsured motorists: 
[N]o automobile liability insurance 
policy insuring against loss resulting 
from liability imposed by law for bodily 
injury or death or property damage 
suffered by any person arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of a motor 
vehicle, shall be delivered . . . unless 
coverage is provided in such policy . . . 
for the protection of persons insured 
thereunder who are legally entitled to 
recover damages from owners or operators 
of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-
run motor vehicles of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, including death, 
resulting therefrom. [Emphasis added.] 
657 P.2d at 280. In Lima, the question considered was whether an 
automobile liability insurance carrier providing uninsured 
motorist coverage might intervene as of right as a party defendant 
in a tort action between its insured and an uninsured motorist 
9 
tort-feasor. Ld. Lima had been injured in a collision with 
Chambers, filed a negligence action against him, and pursued 
discovery in her action. Following Chambers' attorney's 
withdrawal from the case, Lima's attorney prepared an affidavit 
for Chambers' signature which acknowledged the facts that Chambers 
was an uninsured motorist and had caused the collision in which 
Lima was injured. Lima obtained summary judgment on the issue of 
Chambers' liability and her uninsured motorist carrier moved to 
intervene in the action for the purpose of litigating the 
remaining issue of Lima's damages. The trial court denied the 
carrier's motion. This Court reversed, holding that the carrier 
should be allowed to intervene under Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 
[bjecause Section 41-12-21.1 requires insurers 
to assume financial responsibility for 
judgments obtained by their insureds against 
uninsured motorist tortfeasors (within certain 
limits), and because of the insurer's 
contractual obligation which embodies that 
statutory requirement, the insurer "is or may 
be bound" by the tort judgment within the 
meaning of Rule 24. 
657 P.2d at 284 (citations omitted.) 
In reaching its holding, the Court described the 
insurance carrier as "contractually liable for a judgment against 
an uninsured motorist" (657 P.2d at 280). Directly below its 
citation of the statutory requirement that automobile liability 
insurance policies include coverage for accidents with uninsured 
motorists, the Court stated: 
Thus, if an insured is injured by an uninsured 
motorist, the insured may recover damages from 
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his own insurance company upon showing that he 
is "legally entitled" to recover those damages 
from the uninsured tortfeasor. This showing 
of legal entitlement typically entails a 
lawsuit against the uninsured tortfeasor to 
litigate the issues of liability and damages. 
A judgment favorable to the insured fixes the 
insurer's contractual duty to satisfy that 
judgment, within the policy limits. The 
insurer is then left to pursue its subrogation 
remedy against the uninsured tortfeasor. 
657 P.2d at 281 (emphasis added.) 
Lima's case differed factually from appellant's in two 
ways. First, Lima's carrier apparently did not pay her the 
uninsured motorist limits of her policy before she established her 
legal entitlement to recover damages, while Progressive paid the 
policy limits to appellant upon receipt of her claim for them. 
Second, Lima's carrier attempted to intervene in her lawsuit 
while it was pending, while Progressive did not seek to intervene 
in appellant's lawsuit until settlements occurred and a judgment 
was rendered. But Lima is dispositive of the issue whether an 
automobile liability insurance carrier providing uninsured 
motorist coverage has a subrogation remedy against its insured 
when the insured receives a judgment against an uninsured 
motorist. The insurance carrier is contractually liable to the 
insured, up to the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage, for 
the insured's judgment. The carrier must pursue the subrogation 
remedy against the uninsured tort-feasor. 
Thamert v. Continental Cas. Co., 621 P.2d 702 (Utah 
1980), is to the same effect as Lima v. Chambers, supra. Thamert 
was injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist. At the 
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time of the collision, he was in the course of his employment and 
therefore received workers' compensation benefits from his 
employer's workers' compensation carrier. The workers' 
compensation carrier was also the employer's casualty carrier and 
the casualty policy included uninsured motorist coverage. Thamert 
had his own automobile policy which contained uninsured motorist 
coverage. Following judgment by default against the uninsured 
motorist, Thamert filed an action in which he sought the uninsured 
motorist benefits from his employer's casualty carrier and from 
his own automobile carrier. The trial court granted summary 
judgment to both insurance carriers and Thamert appealed. Both 
carriers defended their judgments on the ground, inter alia, that 
any recovery under their uninsured motorist coverage must be 
reduced by amounts paid or payable as workers' compensation. The 
Court held that the insurers should not be permitted to offset 
Thamert's workers' compensation benefits, but remanded for 
determination of problems of fact, the problem of whether either 
insurance was excess, and the question whether its decision 
resulted in overexposure to either insurer. In its decision, the 
Court spoke of the intent behind the uninsured motorist statute as 
follows: 
We are of the opinion that it was the intent 
of the legislature in adopting Section 41-14-
21.1 that an insured, who availed himself of 
uninsured motorist coverage would have 
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621 P.2d at 704 (emphasis added.) This language is critical in 
light of the fact that both of the insurance policies under 
consideration contained provisions which reduced the policy limits 
by any amount the insured should receive under workers' 
compensation laws. Of this fact, the Court stated, 
In considering the respective positions of the 
parties we start from the premise that if we 
are governed by the clear provisions of the 
policies here involved, the plaintiff cannot 
recover. However, the plaintiff contends that 
an insurer cannot by contract, reduce the 
mandatory uninsured motorist coverage required 
A majority of the courts . . . have adopted 
the view that permitting offsets by contract 
would allow insurers to escape all or a part 
of the liability the legislature mandated they 
should provide. 
Id. (emphasis added.) 
The reasoning, and holdings, in Lima and Thamert reveal 
that the purpose and intent of the legislature in enacting 
Sections 31A-22-302 and 31A-22-3Q5(3) were to allow a responsible 
motorist to insure herself against just such a contingency as 
occurred in this case. The appellant chose to carry uninsured 
motorist coverage and paid premiums for the coverage. 
Progressive, choosing to write automobile insurance in Utah in 
exchange for perceived profit, accepted her premiums and extended 
the coverage in the amount and kind set forth by law. When 
appellant was severely injured by a motorist who did not take the 
responsibility of carrying insurance, she was entitled to the full 
uninsured motorist coverage of her own policy upon establishing 
that she was legally entitled to recover damages from the 
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uninsured motorist. Respondent had a right to intervene in 
appellant's action against the uninsured motorist to protect its 
policy limits or contest its insured's entitlement. Progressive 
also has, now, a right to pursue a subrogation remedy against the 
uninsured tort-feasor. Progressive has no right, however, to 
subrogation against its own insured and no right to receive back 
from her that which it was its contractual duty to pay. The trial 
court erred in releasing $20,000.00 of appellant's settlement to 
the respondent. 
B. Personal Injury Protection 
Section 31A-22-302(2) states that every policy of 
insurance purchased to satisfy an automobile owner's proof of 
security under the law "shall also include personal injury 
protection." Personal injury protection coverages and benefits 
are set forth in Section 31A-22-307 and include the reasonable 
value of all expenses for medical, surgical, x-ray, hospital and 
nursing services. 
After appellant's accident with Scholtz, Progressive 
paid $11,163.00 in personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to 
her under the terms of her policy. Appellant's medical expenses 
as a result of the accident were $70,716.76 (R. 774) as of June of 
1987 and, given the nature of her injuries and disability, they 
have continued to accrue. (R. 722-770.) 
This Court discussed PIP benefits under Utah's "no-
fault" auto insurance law in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P. 2d 
1197 (Utah 1980): 
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The true "no-fault" insurance is a type 
of compensation system which couples the 
payment of benefits on a no-fault basis with 
the partial elimination of fault-based tort 
actions for both economic losses and pain and 
suffering. This system generally continues to 
permit fault-based claims for pain and 
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o-fault insurance act 
first, he is granted 
second, he is not 
he benefits provided 
does, however, remain 
tort claims, viz., 
economic losses not 
ts paid under Section 
provisions of Section 
606 P.2d at 119, 1200 (emphasis added.) Under the statutory 
scheme, an insured tort-feasor is not liable for PIP benefits his 
victim receives from her insurer. The victim cannot include the 
PIP benefits as damages in an action against the insured tort-
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feasor. In case of settlement between the tort-feasor 's insurer 
and the victim, the amount of PIP benefits the victim received 
from her own insurer are not included. The tort-feasor's insurer, 
then, is subject to the victim's insurer's claim of subrogation. 
The Ivie Court explained, 
Under the 
tort-feaso 
not person 
for payme 
9(2); the 
personal 
Utah No-Fault Insurance Act, the 
r who has the required security, is 
ally liable to the injured person 
nt of Section 6 benefits, Section 
refore, the tort-feasor has no 
legal obligation to reimburse the 
injured party's insurer. On the other hand. 
the tort-feasor's liability insurer, in 
fulfilling its duty to respond to the claims 
of the injured party to the limits of its 
policy, stands in the shoes of its insured and 
pays on the basis of its insured's personal 
liability to the tort victim; this personal 
liability does not include PIP payments. 
Thus, the tort victim's recovery from the 
liability insurer cannot be reduced by the PIP 
payments. If the victim's recovery be reduced 
by the amount of the PIP payments by granting 
his no-fault insurer a right 
it is the no-fault insurer who 
of subrogation, 
receives double 
recovery, This is so because the insurer 
receives a premium for the benefits, and then 
receives full reimbursement while the 
liability insurance available to recompense 
the victim is depleted by payments for which 
the liability insurer is not responsible to 
the victim. 
However, [the PIP insurer] is not precluded 
from claiming reimbursement from ("the tort-
feasor' s insurer] in an arbitration 
proceeding. 
606 P.2d at 1202, 1203 (emphasis added.) 
At the time of the Ivie decision and the time of 
appellant's accident, Section 31-41-11, Utah Code Ann., was in 
effect. It read, 
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(1) Every insurer authorized to write 
the insurance required by this act shall agree 
as a condition to being allowed to continue to 
write insurance in the State of Utah; 
(a) That where its 
or would be legally liab 
personal injuries sustain 
person to whom benefits 
under this act have bee 
another insurer, including 
insurance fund, it will 
such other insurer for t 
of such benefits, but not 
of the amount of d 
recoverable, and 
insured is 
le for the 
ed by any 
required 
n paid by 
the state 
reimburse 
he payment 
in excess 
amages so 
(b) That the issue of 
liability for such reimbursement and 
the amount of same shall be decided 
by mandatory, binding arbitration 
between the insurers. 
Section 31-41-11 is now embodied in Section 31A-22-309(6), Utah 
Code Ann, which reads 
(6) Every policy providing personal 
injury protection coverage shall provide: 
(a) that where 
under the policy is o 
legally liable for 
injuries sustained b 
whom benefits r 
personal injury prote 
paid by another ins 
the Workers' Compen 
Utah, the insurer of 
would be held legal 
reimburse the other i 
payment, but not i 
amount of damages rec 
the insured 
r would be held 
the personal 
y any person to 
equired under 
ction have been 
urer, including 
sation Fund of 
the person who 
ly liable shall 
nsurer for the 
n excess of the 
overable; and 
(b) that the issue of 
liability for that reimbursement and 
its amount shall be decided by 
mandatory, binding arbitration 
between the insurers. 
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The content of the statutes is the same. Of Section 31-41-11, the 
Ivie Court wrote, 
Section 11 in the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act 
cannot be interpreted as conferring on the no-
fault insurer a right of subrogation to the 
funds received by its insured for personal 
injuries. Section 11 grants the no-fault 
insurer a limited, equitable right to seek 
reimbursement in arbitration proceeding 
against the liability insurer. Section 11 
cannot be deemed as conferring subrogation 
rights on the no-fault insurer, vis-a-vis its 
insured as to his recovery in a settlement or 
legal action. 
606 P.2d at 1202 (emphasis added.) In the context of Ivie, where 
the tort-feasor is insured and his insurance provides the proceeds 
of settlement with the victim, the victim's insurer must seek 
reimbursement for PIP benefits from the tort-feasor's insurer. 
Where, as here, the tort-feasor is not insured, but remains 
personally liable for the benefits paid by the victim's insurer as 
well as for the claims not compensated by such benefits, the 
victim's insurer must seek reimbursement from the tort-feasor 
himself. 
The appellant has settled claims against tort-feasors 
other than the uninsured motorist. This fact does not alter the 
the No-Fault Insurance Act so as to make it confer on insurers 
subrogation rights against their own insureds for PIP benefits. 
Progressive may not have the limited equitable right to seek 
reimbursement in an arbitration proceeding against the motorist 
tortfeasor's insurer, but to reduce appellant's recovery would 
cause the result the court rejected in Ivie: Progressive would 
receive both its premium for the benefits and full 
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reimbursement, while the recovery available to the victim would be 
depleted by payments for which the uninsured motorist remains 
responsible. The trial court erred in releasing to respondent the 
$11,163.00 of appellant's settlement. 
C. Collision Coverage 
Collision coverage, like uninsured motorist coverage, is 
secured and paid for by the responsible driver to protect her 
against the possibility of collision with an irresponsible 
uninsured motorist. Respondent has no right to receive back from 
appellant that for which she paid unless she has received a 
double-recovery. As noted above, and will be explained more fully 
below, appellant has not received double-recovery in this case. 
The trial court erred in releasing to respondent the $3,919.00 of 
appellant's settlement. 
POINT II 
AN INSURER HAS NO RIGHT TO RECOVER FROM 
SETTLEMENT FUNDS COVERAGE PROVIDED AN INSURED 
WHEN ITS POLICY IS UNCLEAR AND THE SETTLEMENT 
FROM WHICH IT SEEKS RECOMPENSE HAS NO RELATION 
TO THE COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THE POLICY. 
A. Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
Progressive's policy states, 
Coverage I — Uninsured Motorists Coverage 
We will pay damages for bodily injury which an 
insured person is legally entitled to recover 
from the owner or operator of an uninsured 
motor vehicle up to the limit of liability as 
defined in this part. The bodily injury must 
be caused by accident and arise out of the 
ownership, maintenance or driving of the 
uninsured motor vehicle. Determination 
whether an insured person is legally entitled 
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to recover damages or the amount of damages 
shall be made by agreement between the insured 
person and us. If no agreement is reached, 
the decision will be made by arbitration. 
Such arbitration must be demanded within one 
year after the date of the accident. If suit 
is brought to determine legal liability or 
damages without our written consent, we are 
not bound by any resulting judgment. 
Progressive Companies' Combination Car Policy Agreement (R. 520-
526), Part IV, p. 4 (R. 524) (emphasis added.) The damages 
Progressive paid appellant under this policy are those which she 
is "legally entitled to recover" from Scholtz, the "owner or 
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle." The funds the trial 
court released to Progressive were monies appellant received from 
the defendant private clubs in settlement of statutory liability 
imposed on the clubs by the Utah Dramshop Act. 
On page 5 of respondent's policy (R. 525), the following 
exclusion to coverage appears: 
Exclusions 
This coverage does not apply to bodily injury 
sustained by a person 
2. If that person 
representative of that 
settlement without our written consent 
or the legal 
person makes a 
Page 5 also contains the following "Trust Agreement": 
Trust Agreement 
If we pay for a loss under this coverage: 
1. We are entitled to recover from you 
an amount equal to such payment if 
there is a legal settlement made on 
your behalf against the person or 
organization legally responsible for 
the bodily injury. 
2. You must hold in trust for us all 
rights to recover money which you 
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have against the person or 
organization legally responsible for 
bodily injury-
3. You must do everything proper to 
secure our rights and do nothing to 
prejudice these rights. 
4. If we ask you in writing, you will 
take necessary or appropriate 
action, through a representative 
designated by us, to recover payment 
as damages from the responsible 
person or organization; if there is 
a recovery, then we shall be 
reimbursed out of the recovery for 
expenses, costs and attorney's fees 
incurred in connection with this 
recovery. 
5. You must execute and deliver to us 
any legal instruments or papers 
necessary to secure the rights and 
obligations of you and us as 
established here. 
The provisions on page 5 are both parts of Part IV, Uninsured 
Motorists. On page 6 of the policy (R. 526), under Part V-
General Provisions, there is the following paragraph: 
5. Our Recovery Rights (Subrogation) 
In the event of any payment under this 
policy, we are entitled to all the rights 
of recovery of the person to whom payment 
was made against another. That person 
must sign and deliver to us any legal 
papers relating to that recovery, do 
whatever else is necessary to help us 
exercise those rights and do nothing 
after loss to prejudice our rights. 
When a person has been paid damages by us 
under this policy and also recovers from 
another, the amount recovered from the 
other shall be held by that person in 
trust for us and reimbursed to us to that 
extent of our payment. 
The question is, do the exclusions and rights stated in these 
various parts of the policy mean that Progressive has a right to 
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deduct from appellant's settlement with the clubs payments it made 
to appellant under her car policy agreement? 
In the case of the uninsured motorist benefits, 
respondent's policy states, in Coverage 1 quoted above, that the 
payment be for bodily injury "caused by accident and arising out 
of the ownership, maintenance or driving of the uninsured motor 
vehicle." The policy must be interpreted in a manner which 
imputes to the various exclusions and the trust and right 
paragraphs the definitions of the specific coverages for which an 
insured receives benefits. The subrogation set forth in the 
General Provisions is in language too broad for an automobile 
insurance policy if it is not tied to the specific coverages set 
forth in the coverage sections of the policy. 
When a problem arises as to the meaning of an insurance 
policy, the courts apply the fundamental principle that when there 
is any question regarding the language of the policy, the 
language should be construed against the party who drafted it. 
Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410, 417 (Utah 
1983); Handley v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 106 Utah 184, 192, 
147 P.2d 319, 322 (1944). Progressive's policy does not make it 
clear whether its intent is to tie its caveats, as well as its 
benefits, to the specific coverages within it. Seal v. Tayco, 
Inc., 400 P.2d 503 (Utah 1965), addressed the problem of differing 
language in separate portions of contract as follows: 
In addressing this problem, certain principles 
should be kept in mind. The first is that in 
case of uncertainty as to the meaning of the 
contract, it should be construed most strictly 
22 
against its framer . . . . A particularized 
application of this well-recognized doctrine 
is that it seems manifestly unfair to permit 
one who formulates a contract to so fashion it 
as to mislead the other party by setting forth 
a clearly apparent promise or representation 
in order to induce acceptance, and then 
designedly "burying" elsewhere in the 
document, in fine print, provisions which 
purport to limit or take away the promise, 
and/or preclude recovery for failure to 
fulfill it. 
Supplemental to and in accord with the 
foregoing is the principle that it is improper 
to excerpt from context and give independent 
meaning to the provision . . . . It must be 
considered in connection with the whole 
contract . . . . 
400 P.2d at 505. 
It is not clear whether Progressive meant the 
subrogation provisions of its policy to apply to any and all 
recoveries its insured might achieve due to the tortious conduct 
of others. Arguably, such a construction is far too broad. But, 
since the policy is not clear, it must be construed against 
Progressive because Progressive drafted it. 
Even if the policy were clear, and the subrogation 
provisions consistent with the other provisions in the policy, 
Progressive would not have subrogation rights against its own 
insured. In Thamert v. Continental Cas. Co., supra, p. ]J^ , the 
Court construed similar, but clear, contract provisions as 
incapable of reducing the mandatory uninsured motorist coverage 
required by the Utah No-Fault Statute. 621 P.2d at 704. The 
Thamert court would not permit an "offset by contract." To permit 
a release of funds appellant received from tort-feasors other than 
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Scholtz, based on liability which did not arise out of 
"ownership, maintenance or driving of the uninsured motor 
vehicle," would be to defeat the purpose for which appellant 
insured herself and the purpose of the No-Fault Insurance 
provision. It would allow the type of reduction Thamert itself 
would not permit• 
B. PIP Benefits and Collision Coverage 
The reasoning which militates against Progressive's 
claims regarding uninsured motorist benefits also applies to PIP 
benefits. The PIP benefits were paid, without regard to fault, 
for injury inflicted by the uninsured motorist, Scholtz, under a 
policy of which appellant availed herself as a responsible 
motorist. Settlement amounts paid to appellant by the clubs for 
statutorily imposed dram shop liability do not reflect any 
benefits appellant insured herself to receive. Even if 
Progressive's policy were not unclear as to whether the insured's 
recovery of damages from one other than a motorist is to be 
included in the subrogation and trust clauses, the law as stated 
in Allstate v. Ivie, supra, denies an insurer subrogation rights 
vis-a-vi its insured as to recovery in a settlement or legal 
action. 
Like uninsured motorist and PIP benefits, collision 
coverage is a matter of contract. Progressive's contract is 
unclear as to reimbursement from recovery received from one other 
than a motorist tort-feasor. As with PIP benefits, double-
recovery of collision coverage is not contemplated under the law, 
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nor would appellant seek it. Her recovery from the clubs, 
however, was not a complete recovery and cannot be construed as 
double-recovery. Progressive's coverage, for which appellant 
contracted and paid, should not become an instrument by which the 
recovery she achieved is depleted. 
POINT III 
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES APPLY TO SUBROGATION, AND 
SUBROGATION IS NOT PERMITTED IF IT WILL WORK 
INJUSTICE TO OTHERS, WHICH WOULD BE THE CASE 
IF AN INSURER WERE ALLOWED TO RECOVER ANY 
PORTION OF AN INSURED'S RECOVERY FROM A TORT-
FEASOR BEFORE THE INSURED WERE MADE WHOLE. 
Progressive claims a right of subrogation against the 
appellant because her settlements with the clubs entailed release 
agreements covering f,all claims" she had against the clubs. This 
argument is identical to the argument made by the insurer in 
Transamerica Insurance Company v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783 (Utah 
1972). The Court's response in Transamerica was: 
Equitable principles apply to subrogation, and 
the insured is entitled to be made whole 
before the insurer may recover any portion of 
the recovery from the tortfeasor. The purpose 
of subrogation, as a creation of equity, is to 
effect an adjustment between parties so as to 
secure ultimately the payment or discharge of 
a debt by a person who in good conscience 
ought to pay for it. 
[Transamerica] to establish a superior equity 
and thus to be entitled to prevail must 
present proof which establishes that the 
damages covered by defendant's settlement were 
the same or cover those for which the 
[insured] has already received indemnity from 
[Transamerica]; otherwise, the receipt of 
payment from the tort-feasor does not entitle 
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[Transamerica] to the return of the payments 
made by it. 
505 P.2d at 786, 787. In this case, respondent cannot present 
proof to establish that the damages covered by appellant's 
settlements were the same or cover those for which respondent 
paid. The facts reveal that the appellant has not been made whole 
by the settlements. Settlements are compromises parties make in 
the interest of time, effort, and economics. Necessarily, no 
settlement ever makes a plaintiff entirely whole. In this case, 
the fact that appellant received a judgment against Scholtz 
underlines the reality respondent seeks to obscure: the appellant 
has not been made whole nor is it likely that she will be, as 
Scholtz is an unemployed laborer who has no assets. 
Transamerica presents further justification for 
rejecting Progressive's asserted right to a portion of the 
appellant's recovery. Transamerica waited until the insured had 
litigated and negotiated his case to settlement, then sued its 
insured. The Court stated, 
Furthermore, if [Transamerica] had an 
opportunity to assert its subrogation rights 
to the tort-feasors and neglected to give 
notice or enforce its demands, the trial 
court may determine under such circumstances 
that [Transamerica's] rights in equity are 
equal or inferior to [the insured's], i.e., 
equity will not relieve one who could have 
relieved himself. 
505 P.2d at 787. Progressive waited until appellant litigated and 
negotiated to settlement her case against the clubs before 
attempting to intervene to enforce its demands. Equity will not 
relieve it in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Under the law, equitable principles, and the facts of 
this case as set forth above, respondent had no right to the 
release of funds granted it by the trial court. Appellant 
respectfully requests from this Court a reversal of the order 
below releasing funds to Progressive and a holding that the funds 
be distributed to appellant as rightfully included in her 
compromise settlement with the two private club defendants 
DATED ____ 
BLACK & MOORE 
this J^^y of April, 1988. 
MOSELEY 
PH E. TESCH 
27 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing Appellant's Brief were mailed, with 
first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on the I day of 
April, 1988, to each of the following: 
David B. Williams 
Rodney R. Parker 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Robert M. Felton 
350 Main Street Association 
5 Triad Center, #585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Dale J. Lambert 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
175 South West Temple, #510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gary B. Ferguson 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
CSB Tower 
50 South Main, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
28 
ADDENDUM NO. 1 
Section 31A-22-302, U.C.A. 
31A-22-302 INSURANCE CODE 
(4) "Occupying" means being in or on a motor vehicle as a passenger or 
operator, or being engaged in the immediate acts of entering, boarding, or 
alighting from a motor vehicle. 
(5) "Operator" has the same meaning as under Subsection 
41-12a-103(7). 
(6) "Owner" has the same meaning as under Subsection 41-12a-103(8). 
(7) "Pedestrian" means any natural person not occupying a motor vehi-
cle. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-301, enacted by ,f41-12a-103(4)" for "41-12a-104", in Subsection 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 155; (5), substituted "41-12a-103(7)" for M41-12a-
1987, ch. 91, § 49. 104", and in Subsection (6), substituted 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- "41-12a-103(8)" for "41-12a-104 " 
ment, in Subsection (1), substituted 
31A-22-302. Required components of motor vehicle insur-
ance policies — Exceptions, 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy 
the owner's or operator's security requirement of § 41-12a-301 shall include: 
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under §§ 31A-22-303 and 
31A-22-304; and 
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under § 31A-22-3Q5, unless affirma-
tively waived under Subsection 31A-22-305(4). 
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies, purchased to satisfy 
the owner's or operator's security requirement of § 41-12a-301, except for 
motorcycles, trailers, and semitrailers, shall also include personal injury pro-
tection under §§ 31A-22-306 t r o u g h 31A-22-30P. 
(3) First party medical cov^ages may be offered or included in policies 
issued to motorcycle, trailer, and semitrailer owners or operators. These 
owners and operators are not covered by personal injury protection coverages 
in connection with injuries incurred while operating any of these vehicles. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-302, enacted by tion (3), and, in Subsection (3), in the first sen-
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1987, ch. 183, § 1. tence inserted "trailer, and semitrailer" and in 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- the second sentence substituted "These" for 
ment, m Subsection (2), inserted "trailers, and "Motorcycle" and "any of these vehicles" for "a 
semitrailers", designated the second and third motorcycle " 
sentences in former Subsection (2) as Subsec-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Liability of county. mer law See Foster v Salt Lake County, 712 
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own ve- P 2d 224 (Utah 1985) 
hides operated by permissive users, under for-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Injury or death caused by assault 
as within coverage of no-fault motor vehicle 
insurance, 44 A.L R.4th 1010 
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ADDENDUM NO. 2 
Section 31A-22-305(3) 
CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-305 
31A-22-303. Motor vehicle liability coverage, 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Liability insurance: when is vehi- from police exclusion: validity and effect, 49 
cle in "dead storage," 48 A.L.R.4th 591. A.L.R.4th 325. 
Automobile liability insurance policy flight 
31A-22-304. Motor vehicle liability policy minimum limits. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Liability of county. mer law. See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 712 
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own ve- P.2d 224 (Utah 1985). 
hides operated by permissive users, under for-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Consortium claim of spouse, par- coverage of automobile liability policy, 46 
ent or child of accident victim as within ex- A.L.R.4th 735. 
tended "per accident" rather than "per person" 
31A-22-305, Uninsured motorist coverage, 
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes: 
(a) the named insured; 
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, 
or guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household, 
including those who usually make their home in the same household but 
temporarily live elsewhere; 
(c) any person occupying a motor vehicle referred to in the policy or 
owned by a self-insurer; and 
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or 
operator of the uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to or 
death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes: 
(a) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not covered 
under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence; or if 
the vehicle is covered, but with lower limits than required by 
§ 31A-22-304, then the motor vehicle is uninsured to the extent of the 
deficiency; 
(b) an unidentified motor vehicle which left the scene of an accident 
proximately caused by its operator; or 
(c) an insured motor vehicle if before or after the accident the liability 
insurer of the motor vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, but the motor vehicle is uninsured only to the extent that the 
claim against the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty association 
or fund. 
(3) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 3~ A-22-302(l)(b) pro-
vides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death, in limits which at least equal the minimum bodily 
Jinjury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under § 31A-22-304. 
JUS 
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ADDENDUM NO. 3 
Section 31A-22-307 
CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-307 
by insured while occupying "owned" vehicle establishing compensation for claims not 
not insured by policy, 30 A.L.R.4th 172. paid because of insurer's insolvency, 30 
Validity, construction, and effect of statute A.L.R.4th 1110. 
31A-22-306. Personal injury protection. 
Personal injury protection under Subsection 31A-22-302(2) provides the 
coverages and benefits described under § 31A-22-307 to persons described 
under § 31A-22-308, but is subject to the limitations, exclusions, and condi-
tions set forth in § 31A-22-309. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-306, enacted by ment, effective July 1, 1986, substituted 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; L. 1986, ch. 204, "31A-22-302(2)" for "31A-22-302(3)" and "in" 
§ 158. for "under." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance fault" or personal injury protection (PIP) cov-
§ 1689. erages in automobile liability policy or poli-
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64. cies, 29 A.L.R.4th 12. 
A.L.R. — Combining or "stacking" of "no Key Numbers. — Insurance <s=> 11.1. 
31A-22-307. Personal injury protection coverages and 
benefits. 
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and br-nefits include: 
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgi-
cal, X-ray, dental, rehabilitation (which includes prosthetic devices), 
ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed a total of 
$3,000 per person; 
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income 
and loss of earning capacity per person from inability to work, for a 
maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss, except that this 
benefit need not be paid for the first three days of disability, unless 
the disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks 
after the date of injury; and 
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a 
maximum of 365 days, for services actually rendered or expenses 
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the in-
jured person would have performed for his household, except that 
this benefit need not be paid for the first three days after the date 
of injury unless the person's inability to perform these services 
continues for more thar. two consecutive weeks; 
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of 
$1,500 per person; and 
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31A-22-307 INSURANCE CODE 
(d) compensation on account of death of a person payable to his 
heirs, m the total of $3,000 
(2) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided 
for m Subsection (1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e), the commis-
sioner shall, at least once each odd-numbered year, conduct a relative value 
study of services and accommodations for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or 
rehabilitation of an injured person m the most populous county m the state 
to assign a unit value and median charge to each type of service and accom-
modation In conducting the study, the department shall consult with ap-
propriate public and private medical and health agencies Upon completion 
of the study, the department shall prepare and publish a relative value 
study which sets forth the unit value and median charge assigned to each 
type of service and accommodation. The value of any service or accommoda-
tion is determined by applying the unit value and median charge assigned 
to the service or accommodation under the relative value study. If a service 
or accommodation is not assigned a unit value or median charge under the 
relative value study, the value of the service or accommodation shall equal 
the reasonable cost of the same or similar service or accommodation m the 
most populous county of this state. This subsection does not preclude the 
department from adopting a schedule already established or a schedule 
prepared by persons outside the department, if it meets the requirements o** 
i^iis subsection In " ^puted cases, a court on its own motion or on the 
motion of either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not 
more than three licensed physicians to examine the claimant and testify on 
the issue of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical expenses 
(3) Medical expenses as provided for m Subsection (l)(a) and m Subsec-
tion 31A-22-309(l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care 
and treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method 
of healing. 
(4) At appropriately reduced premium rates, insurers may offer deducti-
bles m amounts not exceeding $500 per accident with respect to the insur-
ance coverages required under this section However, the deductible is ap-
plicable only to claims of the named insured and persons living m his 
household 
(5) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance 
providing coverages greater than the minimum coverage required under 
this chapter nor does it require the segregation of thof e minimum cover-
ages from other coverages m the same policy. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; L. 1986, ch. 204, 
§ 159. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1986, inserted "pros-
thetic devices" in Subsection (l)(a), and made 
minor stylistic changes throughout the sec-
tion 
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ADDENDUM NO. 4 
Section 31A-22-309 
CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-309 
iting application of these provisions to acci- ring outside the state was in error. IML 
dents "in this state," insurance commis- Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 
sioner's regulation making no-fault insur- 1975). 
ance coverage applicable to incidents occur-
31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to 
personal injury protection. 
(1) No person who has direct benefit coverage under a policy which in-
cludes personal injury protection may maintain a cause of action for gen-
eral damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused 
by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained one or 
more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under 
this part may only exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the injured while occupying an-
other motor vehicle owned by the insured and not insured under 
the policy; 
(ii) f^ any injury sustained by any person while operating ' lie 
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of 
the insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor 
vehicle; or 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to 
his injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony. 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions 
which may be contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under § 31A-22-307 are 
reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
as a result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' 
compensation or similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives (r is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because he is on active 
duty in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other 
policy, including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage 
is given by the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
37 
31A-22-309 INSURANCE CODE 
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in § 31A-22-307 shall be made 
on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are 
overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives rea-
sonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the pe-
riod. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount 
supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after 
that proof is received by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the 
claim that is later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid 
within 30 days after the proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer fails 
to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate 
of 1V2% per month after the due date. The person entitled to the benefits 
may bring an action in contract to recover the expenses plus the applicable 
interest. If the insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits 
and interest, the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee 
to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage shall pro-
vide: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held 
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to 
whom benefits required under personal injury protection have been 
paid by another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of 
Utah, the insurer of the ™.rson who would br ^eld legally liable shall 
reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the 
amount of damages recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the in-
surers. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; L. 1986, ch. 204, 
§ 160. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1986, in the introduc-
tory language of Subsection (1), substituted 
"person has sustained" for "accident caused"; 
in Subsection (l)(b) deleted "or fracture" at 
the end; substituted "$3,000" for "$1,000" in 
Subsection (l)(e); in Subsection (2), redesig-
nated the subsections, rewrote the introduc-
tory language in Subsection (2)(a), and added 
Subsection (2)(b); in Subsection (6)(a), substi-
tuted "Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, 
the insurer of the person who would be held 
legally liable shall" for "State Insurance 
Fund, it will"; and made minor stylistic 
changes throughout the section. 
Meaning of "this code". — See note un-
der same catchline following § 31A-22-102. 
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